In previous work (Berkowitz, Moenius and Pistor, 2006) , we have shown that countries with high quality legal institutions specialize in exporting complex products whose characteristics are difficult to fully specify in contracts. The miracle growth in the "Asian Nine" (China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan and Thailand) during the latter half of the past century has been accompanied by a remarkable increase in complex goods exports and an increase in the ratio of complex to simple goods exports. We test our theory for the Asian Nine and find that good institutions have a substantially stronger than average impact on complex and simple goods trade in those countries. In countries outside the Asian Nine gains in the perceived quality of institutions spur complex exports primarily by lowering the domestic costs of producing complex goods. However, in the Asian Nine good institutions also substantially lower transaction costs of importing and exporting complex goods.
Introduction
Nine Asian countries are considered among the most successful developing economies in the world. As summarized in Table 1 , China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan and Thailand have registered stunning growth rates during the second half of the past century as compared to the rest of the Per capita GDP in developed western countries $9,069 $23,769
Notes: The developed western countries include Western Europe (12 countries), Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the USA. Per capita GDP figure are in constant 1990 dollars. Calculations are based on the numbers constructed by Maddison (2007) . . In all other Asian countries, overall GDP per capita remained roughly constant relative to developed western countries. In Latin America this ratio fell from 35 percent to 25 percent. Even the relatively prosperous nations of Brazil, Chile and Mexico failed to catch up. Finally, GDP per capita in Africa compared to the developed west halved from 12 percent to an alarming 6 percent forty years later.
During this period of rapid growth, the Asian Nine have also seen a massive increase in exports of complex goods that by far outpaced their exports in simple goods 2 : in Thailand in 1962, the ratio of complex to simple product exports was 1 to 13; in 2000 this ratio was 3.5 to 1. Similarly, in Korea, a 1 to 3 ratio in 1960 turned into 13 to 1 by 2000. The changes in Malaysia and Taiwan were even more striking: in 1960 these two countries had complex versus simple export ratios of 1 to 20 and 1 to 2.5, respectively; by 2000, this ratio was 8:5 to 1 in Malaysia and 50 to 1 in Taiwan! There are two candidate explanations for those shifts: as emphasized in the growth literature, factor accumulation as well as industrial and trade policies 3 could serve as the main driver. Storm and Nastepaad (2005) document shifts in exports that are consistent with that hypothesis, but do not actually estimate their influence. Alternatively, recent work by Rauch and Trindade (2002) indicates that informal institutions (particularly, overseas' Chinese networks) increase trade for both complex and simple goods in Asian economies; moreover, they find the effect of informal institutions to be substantially stronger for trade in complex goods. However, as they note themselves, it seems that the influence of Chinese networks as one example of informal institutions vanishes, possibly due to an increase in the growing importance of legal institutions during the period of their study.
In this paper we study the hypothesis that improvements in the quality of legal institutions promoted the specialization into complex goods exports in the Asian Nine. Complex goods are highly differentiated and have many characteristics that can be difficult to describe or quantify, such as design, comfort and fashion: thus, it is impossible to fully specify all details of an order for complex goods. Thus, contracts for complex goods tend to be highly incomplete. Trade theorists argue that exports of highly differentiated, or what we will denote complex, goods are typically more profitable than exports of simple goods such as food and raw materials. As emphasized by Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Rodrik (2008) , the productive reinvestment of rents from complex exports can drive growth.
Berkowitz, Moenius and Pistor (2006) argue that high quality legal institutions promote complex exports for two reasons. First, because the production of complex goods always involves some degree of outsourcing, their assembly is highly dependent on institutions that cheaply and quickly enforce contracts and resolve business disputes. Thus, good institutions lower the production costs of complex products by reducing the likelihood of rent-seeking and holdup on the production chain. Since these issues are less important for simple goods, good institutions increase a country's comparative Asia-Pacific Journal of Accounting & Economics 15 (2008) 291-316 294 advantage in complex goods. Secondly, potential trade partners will be reluctant to import complex goods if they cannot trust that conflicts about deliveries that do not meet their expectations can be resolved. Since good quality legal institutions located in the exporter's domicile are effectively the enforcer of trade contracts of last resort, 4 they can lower importer risk or transaction costs. Therefore, countries that improve their formal institutions export more complex goods by the production cost effect and the transaction cost effect. By a similar argument, good quality institutions in the exporter's country also favor simple goods exports. However, if high quality legal institutions favor complex goods production and exports of both complex and simple goods compete for the same scarce resources, then an improvement in institutions raises factor costs and then the production cost effect for simple goods is negative.
5
This influence of institutional improvements on factor costs has two implications: first, countries that improve their legal institutions should experience a stronger shift from simple into complex product exports than those that do not; secondly, while the effect of legal institutions on complex exports should be decisively positive, their effect on simple goods exports is indeterminate.
The main contribution of this paper is to account for the role of legal institutions in the remarkable shift from simple to complex exports in the Asian Nine. We do so in two steps. First, we expand the data set in Berkowitz et al. (2006) to include 16 years versus 11 years and 124 versus 55 countries. We find the major results are generally robust in this larger sample. We then estimate the impact of legal institutions in the Asian Nine on trade separately. The results are striking: in the Asian Nine, institutional reform is associated with more than one and a half times as strong an expansion of complex exports and two and a half times as strong a reduction of simple exports than in the rest of the world. Thus, increases in the quality of legal institutions in the Asian Nine have a substantial direct effect on complex goods and an even larger indirect effect on simple goods exports, and are associated with an extraordinary increase in the ratio of complex versus simple goods exports.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section we summarize the evolution of simple and complex exports and the quality of legal institutions in the Asian Nine. In section three, we summarize our theory; in section four we describe our estimating procedure; in section five we present our results and also propose several explanations for our findings that institutional changes in the Asian Nine are stronger than in the rest of the world. In section six we conclude.
Exports and Changes in Legal Institutions in the Asian Nine 6
In this section we first document the shift from simple to complex goods exports in the Asian Nine from 1962 to 2000. Figure 1 displays the ratios of complex versus simple goods during that time period for the Asian Nine countries. We include vertical lines in 1982 and 1997 to indicate data-availability on legal institutions for the regression analysis below. 1962 1965 1968 1971 1974 1977 1980 1983 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 Clearly, all countries have seen a tremendous increase in the ratios of complex versus simple goods exports. However, the figure does not allow us to identify the absolute magnitude of those exports. Since data availability limits our regression analysis to the years from 1982 to 1997, we document total exports in simple and complex goods within our sample in Figure 2 . Asia-Pacific Journal of Accounting & Economics 15 (2008) 291-316 296 Figure 2 1982 1985 1988 1991 1994 1997 China 1982 1985 1988 1991 1994 1997 Hong Kong complex simple 1982 1985 1988 1991 1994 1997 Indonesia 1982 1985 1988 1991 1994 1997 Japan 1982 1985 1988 1991 1994 1997 Korea 1982 1985 1988 1991 1994 1997 Malaysia 1982 1985 1988 1991 1994 1997 Singapore 1982 1985 1988 1991 1994 1997 Thailand 1982 1985 1988 1991 1994 1997 Taiwan
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The figure clearly indicates that complex exports rose substantially, while simple goods even in nominal dollars stayed roughly constant for almost all of the Asian Nine. It is this difference that we attempt to address with our theory. Those increases in the ratios of complex versus simple goods exports mimic the catch-up patterns in growth rates. To see this, we computed the percentile position of the ratio in each year relative to all other countries. For example, a percentile value of 30 indicates that 30 percent of all countries had a lower ratio of complex versus simple goods exports while 70 percent had a higher ratio. 1962 1965 1968 1971 1974 1977 1980 1983 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 The figure shows that the Asian Nine not only increased their ratios of complex versus simple goods exports, those that were in the top quintile by the mid-1970s (Japan, Hong Kong, South Korea and Taiwan) stayed there; moreover, all of the Asian Nine countries were above the 50 percent level as of 2000. Moreover, it is striking that Malaysia's relative position as exporter moved from almost the bottom quintile in 1962 to the top quintile by 2000.
Finally, we document the overall development of legal institutions for the Asian Nine in our data-set. Here we compute an average measure of institutions that includes sub-indices for rule of law, expropriation risk, government corruption and quality of the bureaucracy.
7 Data availability limits this analysis again to the years from 1982 to 1997. The pattern in Figure 4 resembles the pattern in Figure 3 : countries with good quality institutions stayed in the higher ranks while those with lower quality institutions moved up in the rankings. Before we can subject those stylized facts to a more rigorous econometric analysis, we need to discuss our theory of institutions and comparative advantage and its implications in some more detail.
Legal Institutions, Production-and Transaction-Cost Effects 8
In an effort to understand the forces that helped the Asian Nine increase its complex goods exports, we first summarize our theory of institutions and trade in complex and simple goods. Consider how legal institutions, herein denoted simply as institutions, affect trade of two fictitious countries, denoted Asia and Not Asia. These two countries are the same in all respects except for the quality of their institutions. Thus, Asia and Not Asia have roughly the same GDP, population, distance to other trading partners, technology levels, etc. However, institutions for enforcing contracts and resolving trade disputes are of a higher quality in Asia. If we ignore these differences in the quality of institutions, we expect that Asia and Not Asia would have very similar trading patterns with countries around the world.
How then would institutions influence imports and exports of complex products from Asia and Not Asia? We ignore the role of institutions in offsetting the exporter's risk of not getting paid for shipment, because this problem is easily resolved by contractual means such as letters of credit, prepayment and counter-trade agreements. Instead we focus on the role that institutions play in offsetting the importer's risk of receiving a substandard product. Formal institutions are important for mitigating risk since contractual solutions such as letters of acceptance that enable importers to withhold payment until the quality of goods has been verified are generally ineffective. This is because the period of time in which importers can verify products is generally short and problems often emerge after this acceptance period has expired.
We first consider how institutional quality influences the risk of importing from Asia and Not Asia, and then consider the role of product complexity. If an exporter located in either Asia or Not Asia believes that the courts in her country will punish her for breach of contract with high probability, she clearly has a strong incentive to make a good faith effort to fulfill the explicit and even implicit terms of this trade contract with the import partner. This good faith effort from an exporter increases the probability that an importer is satisfied and the demand for exports from either Asia or Not Asia is increasing in the probability that institutions efficiently enforce contracts.
What is critical to our argument is that institutions located within the exporter's country are "the contract enforcers of last resort" when the exporter has breached her contract. While parties may try to resolve disputes by using courts in the importer's country or by using an arbitration tribunal or court outside the exporter's and importer's country, enforcement institutions in the exporter's home country are the importer's last resort for ensuring that she is effectively compensated for breach of contract. This is because the exporter typically holds most of her assets in her home country, and any attempt to seize these assets in order to satisfy the importer's claims must be made in the exporter's country with the help of the local police, courts and bailiffs.
Product complexity is also important because the probability that contracts are correctly and efficiently enforced increases not only when courts exercise impartiality, but also when they have competence to rule on cases involving complex goods. Impartiality includes absence of corruption and lack of any bias in favor of home countries that could influence the court's ruling.
Product complexity also influences the importer's risk of buying goods from Asia and Not Asia. As previously argued, complex products, such as machines and even mass-produced clothing, contain characteristics that can be difficult to quantify, such as fashion or authenticity; that are numerous, as in the case of the many features contained in a laptop computer, and highly differentiated across otherwise similar products. The risk that an importer is dissatisfied with a received shipment clearly increases with a good's complexity.
9 All of this implies that the probability that an importer is dissatisfied and relies on formal institutions to resolve a dispute increases in product complexity. And, from the perspective of the importer, the probability of effective enforcement increases in the quality of exporter institutions and decreases in product complexity. Therefore, the probability of an order that an importer expects to be in compliance Asia-Pacific Journal of Accounting & Economics 15 (2008) 291-316 300 with the contract is determined by both the quality of exporter institutions and product complexity.
Recall that we assumed Asia had higher quality legal institutions than Not Asia. Thus, firms that import from Asia, with its higher quality institutions, have a greater probability of being compensated when exporters breach contracts than firms who import from Not Asia. Consequently, the importer's transactions costs are lower when importing from Asia. Because importers are more likely to be dissatisfied with shipments of complex goods, they select exporters located in countries with high quality institutions. Consequently, firms are more likely to import complex goods from Asia.
The quality of institutions also influences domestic production and exchange patterns. Firms gain competitive advantage by focusing on those parts of the value chain that they do best and outsource as many of all others as can be done cost effectively. The more complex products are, the longer in general is the value chain and the more parts of it could potentially be outsourced. By the same arguments as in the international markets, low quality legal institutions increase the risk that the buyer receives substandard shipments from domestic suppliers and that courts fail to punish producers that ship substandard products. This has two effects: first, firms shy away from outsourcing parts of the value chain that they otherwise would, despite the fact that they are not the most efficient producer. And, for those parts that are still outsourced, the increased risk of low quality deliveries and low quality enforcement implies a higher expected domestic transaction cost. We denote the combined domestic transaction and production costs simply as production costs. Because Asia has better institutions, its production costs for complex goods are lower than in Not Asia. And, since the only difference between Asia and Not Asia is that Asia has the better institutions, then Asia has a comparative advantage in goods that make intensive use of legal institutions, and will thus export more complex goods than Not Asia.
We use these concepts to make predictions about the influence of institutions on trade in complex and simple product markets. In complex goods markets, since Asia has better quality institutions, its own production costs and the share of transaction costs attributable to contract enforcement are lower. As mentioned before, we therefore expect that Asia would export more complex goods than Not Asia. In the case of complex goods imports, Asia will import less than Not Asia because it has lower production costs and will therefore produce more of those goods itself. Moreover, its own high quality institutions imply that less stealing and hold-up occurs at its border, which implies that Asia's transaction costs as an importer are lower than transaction costs in Not Asia.
10
Thus, complex imports are lower in Asia than Not Asia by the production cost effect and higher by the transaction cost effect. Consequently, the overall effect of institutional reform in Asia and Not Asia depends upon the relative strength of the production cost and transaction cost effect of institutions on imports.
In the case of simple goods, the production cost effect of institutions has the opposite sign of their effects in complex goods markets. Because Asia has a comparative advantage in complex products, it exports more and imports less complex products than Not Asia. Under balanced trade, Asia then exports less and imports more simple products than Not Asia. Thus, following an institutional reform, Asia imports more simple products because of the production cost and transaction cost effects; however, the overall effect of reform on Asia's exports of simple goods is ambiguous and depends upon the relative magnitudes of the negative production cost effect and the positive transaction cost effect. 
Estimation
Data
Export data is obtained from the NBER-UN Trade Database (Feenstra et al., 2005) , which contains bilateral trade flows at the four-digit SITC level, revision 2. We use the classification developed by Rauch (1999) , which allows us to classify exports as complex or simple. Rauch identifies four-digit SITC industries according to their trading characteristics and sorts them into three categories: goods that are predominantly traded on organized exchanges (metals, pork), those that have reference prices (chemicals, fertilizers), and a default category for all others (e.g., shoes, cars, and machinery). This classification naturally reflects product complexity, since only low complexity, commoditized goods can be traded on organized exchanges, and those goods are thus denoted as simple, while "neither" captures high complexity.
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The national accounts data is taken from the World Bank Development Indicators and the gravity controls are from the CEPII data (Mayer and Zignago 2006) . In their data-set, "distance" measures the shortest arc distance between the most populated cities of each country. "Colonial tie" is a dummy variable that indicates a colonial governance relationship that existed post 1945. Two countries are contiguous if they share a common land border and the corresponding dummy variable assumes a value of one in this case and zero otherwise. "Common language", again, is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if two countries share a primary or official language. The construction of the (ad hoc) remoteness variable as a control follows the simple structure suggested in Head (2003) .
We measure the quality of institutions with survey data from the International Country Risk Guide, advocated by Knack and Keefer (1995) and Kaufmann et al. (1999) .
We construct an annual index from a simple average of quality ratings of institutions by country. Individual ratings range from one to ten with ten representing the highest quality. We average over the indices of the rule of law, expropriation risk, corruption in government, and bureaucratic quality.
12 We exclude the ratings for repudiation of government contracts and ethnic tensions, since they do not reflect the idea of legal quality described above. Combining all data-sets allowed us to construct data for 124 countries (see Appendix Table A1 ).
Estimation
In Berkowitz, Moenius and Pistor (2006) and Moenius and Berkowitz (2007) we discuss at length how we can test the predictions of our model by using a gravity specification of bilateral trade-flows. Our main assumption is that each national economy only consists of a complex goods sector and a simple goods sector. The modifications we add to the model in Dornbusch, Fisher and Samuelson (1977) are such that domestic institutions influence both domestic production and international transaction costs. This leads us to estimate the following empirical model:
where IM ijtk denotes the dollar value of goods produced in country j and exported to country i in year t and sector k, where k stands for the complex or simple goods sector. X ijt is the matrix of standard gravity controls described in section 4.1, including GDP and GDP per capita for each country, the arc distance between country-pairs, contiguity, colonial ties, shared official languages and remoteness. The coefficients ik and jk correspond to country dummy variables, each of which assumes a value of one if a country is either an exporter or importer in a bilateral trading relationship, and zero otherwise. These dummy variables absorb country-specific effects which can be assumed constant over the 16-year time-period (such as geography and infrastructure in general).
13 At the core of our analysis are it I and jt I , the variables containing information about the quality level of exporter and importer legal institutions (for herein, denoted institutions).
In order to estimate the effect that institutions have in the Asian Nine as compared to all other countries, we interact it I and jt I (importer and exporter institutions) with 12 We will also consider the effects of these four institutional measures separately (see footnote 16). Export data comprises transactions between unaffiliated traders and between parent companies and their foreign subsidiaries. While, for example, expropriation risk may be more important for the latter, the rule of law will be more important for the former type of transaction. Since we cannot unbundle our export data based on ownership of the transacting parties, we include relevant dimensions for both types of transactions in the construction of our measure.
13 For this regression to be identified, we need to assume that multilateral resistance terms as in Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) are constant over time. While this is inconsistent with the theoretical idea of their model, in previous work (Berkowitz et al, 2006, and Berkowitz, 2007) 
In equation (2) we also include the dummy variable D aj as a separate regressor to control for level effects in trade of the Asian Nine that might otherwise be attributed to their exporter institutions.
We also adjust our standard errors in order to address a distortion that can emerge when we estimate a gravity model over many years. Since the same country's characteristics such as distance and colonial links are fixed over time, the standard errors for their regressors may potentially be too small. Error terms within those groups of repetitions are likely to be correlated with each other, while error terms across groups should not be correlated. We account for this grouping effect by replacing regular Huber-White errors (White, 1980) with robust standard errors that additionally account for within-group correlation. The standard errors we report are consequently higher than those with Huber-White errors, and this weakens the statistical significance of some of our results. We deem this necessary so that we can draw more cautious inferences.
Results and Interpretations
Our analysis proceeds in several steps. First, we attempt to replicate the previous results from Berkowitz et al. (2006) with our expanded data set which uses the average of the four indices for institutional quality (i.e., rule of law, expropriation risk, corruption and bureaucratic quality). Then we estimate coefficients for legal institutions in the Asian Nine countries separately. Finally, we conduct robustness checks for classifications of the Asian group. Table 2 indicates the predicted effects of legal institutions on trade by sector. We estimate these predicted effects separately for each sector. Consequently, each step requires at least two regressions: one with simple and one with complex goods as the left hand side variable.
Results for our first step are provided in Table 3 . It is notable that all the point estimates for the impact of the standard gravity control variables are within the normal ranges. It is, however, mildly surprising that the sign of the regressor for the remoteness variable for simple goods is negative. This is counter-intuitive because it indicates that a remote country imports more simple goods from sources that are far away and less from the countries that are close by. However, since simple goods include oil and all kinds of raw materials, availability of the necessary raw materials may be more of an issue, explaining the sign reversal.
Secondly, we note that in the full sample regression for complex goods reported in column (1), the point estimate for exporter institutions is positive and consistent with our theory and the coefficient for importer institutions is negative and consistent with
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304 our result that production cost effects dominate transaction cost effects. Moreover, the coefficients for exporter and importer institutions are of similar magnitude and significance as in our previous studies. In full sample regressions for simple goods in column (2), the coefficient for exporter institutions is negative, which is consistent with our theory and with our previous results that production cost effects dominate transaction cost effects. However, the effect of importer institutions is negative, and our theory predicts this effect should be unambiguously positive.
In related work (Moenius and Berkowitz, 2007) , we find that our theory breaks down in the simple goods sector in countries that have very poor quality institutions. When institutions are sufficiently poor, then marginally improving them does not result in a shift into complex exports and additional simple imports. Since we have expanded our sample for this estimation to include many more countries with low quality institutions, we re-estimate our model controlling for those countries with very low quality institutions by using dummy-variables for the bottom 15 percent and then interacting these dummy-variables with the importer and exporter institutions variables. We also suspected that countries at the top end of legal quality, like the European Union, might have imposed restrictions that were independent of legal quality that we were not able to control for. We therefore similarly controlled for the EU countries. The results for both simple and complex goods are reported in columns (3) and (4) of Table 3 .
14 The point estimates for all of the gravity control variables are within the normal ranges; and the regressors for institution are generally consistent with our theory and are also consistent with our findings that production cost effects dominate transaction cost effects. However, our theory also predicts the coefficient on importer institutions to be larger in absolute value than the coefficient on exporter institutions, which is not the case in the estimate where we control for EU countries only.
Because we therefore suspect that there could be other high quality institutional countries besides EU countries that might provide us with similar threshold effects, we remove the countries with the 15 percent lowest and highest quality institutions from our sample. 15 The results for the remaining observations are provided in columns (5) and (6) in Table 3 . We find there is very little change in the complex goods regressions, and now all results for exporter and importer institutions for our simple goods regressions are consistent with our theoretical predictions. We use columns (5) and (6) from Table 3 as our baseline regressions.
In Table 4 we report estimates for the differential impact of institutions for the Asian Nine. Before doing this, we interpret the results in our baseline regressions (now reported in columns (1) and (2) in Table 4 ) in the context of our model. First, the estimates in column (1) imply that when there is a 10 percent increase in the perceived quality of an exporter's institutions, that country exports roughly 17 percent more complex goods and its imports of complex goods are reduced by roughly 6 percent. The indirect effect on simple goods for this country is just the reverse: a 10 percent improvement of the perception of its legal quality will reduce its simple goods exports by 4 percent and increase its simple goods imports by 9%.
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Taking our model literally, we can decompose these effects of exporter and importer institutions into production cost and transaction cost effects. In this model, balanced trade flows imply production cost effects for exporter and importer institutions in both the complex goods sector and the simple sector add up to zero. Thus, if we add the coefficients for importer and exporter institutions in complex markets, we obtain overall transaction costs equal to -0.63 + 1.69 = 1.06. In simple markets the sum of point estimates for importer and exporter institutions is 0.88 0.41 = 0.47. Both estimates are statistically significant and the overall transaction costs in complex markets (1.06) are higher than in simple markets (0.47).
Consider the estimates for the Asian Nine in Table 4 columns (3) and (4). Since we exclude countries with institutions in the top and bottom 15 percent, Singapore and Hong Kong should be dropped in 1982, Japan should be dropped from 1982, 1983 and 1993 to 1995 when the quality of its institutions was in the top 15 percent, and Indonesia should be dropped during 1983-1990 when its institutions were in the bottom 15 percent. However, we include all of the Asian Nine countries each year since our goal is to analyze trade flows to and from the Asian Nine (this also applies to the baseline regressions).
In complex markets, point estimates for exporter institutions in the rest of the world fall from 1.69 to 1.29, while the negative influence of importer institutions mildly changes from -0.63 to -0.73. Thus, overall transaction costs in the rest of world fall from 1.06 to 1.29 0.73 = 0.56. If we add up the Asian Nine interaction terms in exporter and importer complex markets, then differential production cost effects add up to zero and overall differential transaction costs in the Asian Nine equal = 1.29 + 0.90 0.73 + 0.42 =1.88. Thus, overall transaction cost effects in the Asian Nine (1.88) are much larger than in the rest of the world (0.56).
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We can also obtain a sense of the importance of transaction versus production costs in the Asian Nine versus the rest of the world. Recall that the impact of importer institutions in complex markets is ambiguous: when the production cost effect is 16 In the context of panel data, if our institutional variables are predetermined instead of exogenous, serial correlation may cause bias of our estimates similar to endogeneity. In unreported regressions we therefore corrected for serial correlation by using the Prais-Winsten method for the regressions in Tables 3 and 4. All of our results, however, are unaffected by this adjustment. Recall that we do not have disaggregate trade data by ownership, namely trade between affiliated and unaffiliated parties, which use different types of institutions intensively. We therefore average the rule of law, expropriation risk, corruption in government and bureaucratic quality to obtain our institutional quality measure. However, we can still answer the question which of these components has the strongest effect on overall trade and see whether our results are robust to this decomposition. In unreported regressions we therefore enter these four institutional variables in the equations in Tables 3 and 4 separately for exporters and importers. We find that the predictions of our theory still hold. In particular, for the Asian Nine we find that expropriation risk and rule of law have the strongest quantitative influence in complex product markets and expropriation risk and bureaucratic quality have the strongest quantitative influence in simple product markets. We are grateful to an anonymous referee for both suggestions.
17 One might wonder whether this strong result is an artifact of cutting the lowest and the highest quality institutional countries from the sample. However, this is not the case: when we consider the entire sample transaction cost effects for the Asian Nine there are 2.01, while they are 0.04 for the rest of the world. stronger than transaction cost effects, the impact is negative; and, as transaction cost effects become relatively stronger, the impact of importer institutions becomes less negative (or more positive). The impact of importer institutions in the rest of the world is -0.73, and their impact within the Asian Nine is -0.73 + 0.42 = -0.31. Thus, the transaction cost effects of institutional reform on complex imports are relatively stronger than the production cost effects in the Asian Nine than in the rest of the world.
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All of this suggests that institutional reforms are typically associated with gains in a country's comparative advantage in producing and exporting complex goods. However, institutional reforms in the Asian Nine are also associated with the emergence of firms that are more reliable export partners and more effective importers.
In simple markets, overall transaction costs in the rest of the world equal 0.59 0.28 = 0.31. However, we fail to reject the null hypothesis that overall transaction costs are insignificant at the 10 percent level (the p-value is 0.12). The overall differential transaction costs in the Asian Nine are 1.03 + 0.59 0.41 0.28 = 0.93, 19 and overall transaction cost effects are higher in the Asian Nine. Moreover, in simple goods markets the impact of exporter institutions depends upon the relative strength of the negative production cost and the positive transaction cost effects. In the rest of the world, the impact of exporter institutions is -0.28 and, since transaction costs are insignificant our model attributes this effect to production costs. In the Asian Nine, the impact of exporter institutions is -0.28 0.41 = -0.69, and again, production costs are relatively stronger than transaction cost effects.
Thus, in the Asian Nine gains in the perceived quality of institutions are associated with a strong negative production cost effect and moderate positive transaction cost effect in simple goods markets, and a strong positive production cost effect and again a strong transaction cost effect in the complex goods markets. Both combined lead to a very pronounced shift into the production of complex goods. Because institutional reforms are also associated with a decline in the transaction costs of importing from the Asian Nine, a large quantity of these complex goods produced in the Asian Nine is exported on world markets.
Why then does institutional reform of similar magnitude have such different effects in the Asian Nine compared to the rest of the world? The Asian Nine are well known for using export promotion policies such as special export zones and export subsidies. While we do not have appropriate controls for these policies, our results suggest that institutional reforms could have a strong complementary effect on these policies. Thus an importer's risk will fall when the government in the exporter's country includes guarantees that trade contracts will be enforced as part of its export promotion.
Just how particular institutions within the Asian Nine enforce these contracts and persuade importers that the risks of importing from an Asian Nine country are low is, however, an open question. These mechanisms are particularly important to understand in China where judges appear to have limited power to rule against the Communist Party or to enforce contracts. For example, provincial communist party committees have the power to appoint, dismiss or transfer their judges and they also have the power to interfere with decisions made by judges (see, for example, Garz, 2003) .
What institutions assure importers that their contracts with Chinese firms will be enforced? Allen et al. (2005) show that provincial governments in China help the domestic businesses on their territories conduct commercial transactions and serve as a substitute for formal institutions that protect property rights and enforce contracts. Li and Zhou (2005) document how Chinese provincial governments often enforce commercial contracts and settle commercial disputes. And Li et al., (2007) document that a company's political connections with the Communist Party are strongly positively associated with the extent to which Chinese provincial legal institutions will enforce contracts; moreover, these political connections become more important for enforcement in provinces where courts and other legal institutions are poorly developed. And there is substantial journalistic and anecdotal evidence that provincial governments are very tough on firms located within their province that breach export contracts.
20 The extent to which Chinese provincial governments can persuade importers that they are a good substitute for independent courts, however, is an area for future research.
An alternative explanation for the extraordinary growth in complex exports from China is based on the work of Feenstra and Hanson (2004) . They document that traders located in Hong Kong search for -and find -Chinese exporters who can meet demanding product specifications. Those traders even sometimes add value through reprocessing complex Chinese exports. The Hong Kong traders then use their reputation on world markets to certify the quality of these Chinese exports. To ensure that our results are not predominantly driven by those two economies, we drop China and Hong Kong from the regressions reported in Table 4 , columns (1) -(4). The results we obtain from these regressions are essentially unchanged and the results are available upon request. Thus, even if reputation effects of Hong Kong traders are important for China, the quality of institutions clearly has played a role in promoting the growth in complex exports from the other Asian Nine economies.
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We also consider several other classifications of the Asian economies. First, we drop Japan from the Asian group since it has been a member of the OECD for more than 40 years and since its GDP has been at the OECD level since the mid-1970s. Our results are robust to this change. The Asian Nine include the newly industrializing economies of Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan, which have all grown rapidly since the 1980s. When we consider these as a separate group, our results for the effect are no longer robust. While the estimated impacts of the institutional variables are consistent with the theory, they tend to lose statistical significance. Thus, clearly, pooling the less developed members of the Asian Nine including Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand is critical for our theory (see the Appendix, Tables A2, A3 and A4) .
Finally, the theory of product cycles also provides an alternative explanation for the spectacular growth in the complex exports from the Asian Nine (see, for example, Flam and Helpman, 1987) . According to this theory, a rich country, which would exclude the Asian Nine in the 1960s and 1970s, would invent a product at home, develop an efficient production process and then shift this production process abroad to developing countries that would include all of the Asian Nine in the 1960s and 1970s. This theory is complementary to our trade and institutions theory, since countries with high quality institutions provide better production and marketing facilities for those countries who want to shift their production processes abroad.
Conclusions
During 1962-2000 there was a tremendous growth in complex exports and an increase in the ratio of complex versus simple exports in the Asian Nine. Our results indicate that gains in quality of institutions are a major force in this impressive export performance within the Asian Nine. In countries around the world institutional gains on average led to more complex exports by lowering the production costs of complex goods. However, in the Asian Nine institutional reform spurred complex exports by also lowering the transaction costs of their import partners.
Our methodology does not identify precise channels through which institutions spur complex exports within the Asian Nine. We speculate that these reforms complemented export promotion policies such as special export zones and export subsidies that the Asian Nine have employed. Our results also raise the question of how provincial governments in China provided assurance to importers that their contracts with Chinese firms would be enforced.
Finally, the question remains whether trade networks of Chinese businessmen living outside of China that Rauch and Trindade (2002) found to be important for spurring complex exports from the Asian Nine would have been as effective as improvements in the quality of institutions. Our preliminary answer is that the impact of networks would probably not be of the same order of magnitude. Networks, to function properly, need to be limited in membership, while institutional reform is much less exclusive. Moreover, institutions located within a country lower production costs throughout that country and lower transaction costs of many potential trade partners, while the influence of networks is much more limited in scope. Consequently, networks alone would likely not have been as catalytic to other economic policies as institutional reform. Robust standard errors that account for within-group correlation are reported in parentheses. Clusters are around country-pairs. The same convention holds in Table 4 . 
Additional controls
Time-dummies and country-dummies, GDP importer, GDP exporter, GDP per capita importer, GDP per capita exporter, distance, adjacent, links, language similarities, remoteness. 
Time-dummies and country-dummies, GDP importer, GDP exporter, GDP per capita importer, GDP per capita exporter, distance, adjacent, links, language similarities, remoteness.
